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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on whether apartheid South Africa's
approach to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has
been hegemonic and whether a democratic South Africa will
ensure leadership of SACU member countries to enhance
mutual economic development or maintain a hegemonic
approach.
Institutional r6constitution and democratisation are terms
which have recently regained popularity in SACU. Bot.awana,
Lesotho, Narni.b.i.and Swaziland (BLNS) are attempting to
develop a programme which would accelerate the process of
participatory fairness. South Africa on the other hand is
initiating consultative forums between SACU member
countries to incorporate popular aspirations and address
tensions emanating from a concentration of industry in
South Africa.
This paper begins by providing a history characterised by
hegemonic relationships of the pre-1994 period between
South Africa and the BLNS countries, which is followed by
a theoretical approach to options for solutions for the
regional integration complexities of Southern Africa,
referring '!lore specifically to SACU. South Africa's
initiative to facilitate participation of member
countries, which culminated in the introduction of the
Customs Union Task Team (CUTT), received attention.
The general discussion of interviews test the theoretical
perspective of participative engagement of SACU
membership, and provide suggestions towards the future of
the customs union. A conclusive analysis and
recommendations for further research are presented.
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CHAPTER ONE
1 BACKGROUND
1.1 REGIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION.
The word 'region' can have different contextual
meanings, for example, in South Africa a region is a
sub-divisiun of a province. In the global context, and
in the united Nations system, Africa can be regarded as
a region. However, for the purpose of this research
report, the 'region' under consideration is Sout.hoz'n
Africa, defined in political t.erms by membership of Lle
Southern African Development Communit.y (SADC). This
paper focuses on the member states of SAeU, Sout.h
Africa, Lesotho (landlocked by the RSA) , Swaziland
(landlocked and part.ially bordered by RSA) I Botswana
(inland) and Namibia (on the Western side) .
According to Gibb (1997: 71) 'regionalism' can be
interpreted as, "An attempt by nat.ion states to control
at.the regional level what they have increasingly failed
t.o manage at the national and multilateral levels."
Furthermor?, Gibb (1997: 71) explains reglonaJism in the
following' :nanner: \I It is ;t new form of internationaJ
regulation designed to accommodate the contradictory
requirements of flexibilitYi that is, to preserve and in
some cases intensify the mobility in the fact.ors of
production whilst at the same time limiting the threat
of foreign trade."
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Regional economic co-operation can be explained as an
agreement made by neighbouring countries in an attempt
to address the economic problems prevalent within them.
Furthe:::-more, economic oo-ope re t.Lon allows for a
situation whereby partner stat~s Gstablish partnerships
and opportunities in e~onomic activities. This process
helps
trade
states.
to initiate economic solidarity which enhances
liberalisation and the grouping of regional
This initiative further enhances the
establishment of optimum economic _;:)olicies.
The advant aqes of regional co-operation range from the
establishment of wider markets, greater economies of
scale, efficient transportation systems and greater
bargaining power to enhancement of industrial
efficiency, technological and innovative skills, as well
as better division of labour and speciulisation of
production.
1.2 GENERAL VISION AND CONDITIONS FOR REGIONAL
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
The general vision for regional ecoLomic co-operation is
the attainment, through trade relations, of the highest
possible level of economic development by member
countries. This vision is sometimes over-shadowed and
distorted by the hegemonic approaches from the member
states which have attained some fo~m of economic
prosperity within the co-operating countries thus
resulting in skewed economic development.
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According to Matsebula (1996: 3-5), the seven conditions
for a successful regional strategy are as follows:
(i) There must be strong political will among all the
member countries. Entailed in this condition is the
preparedness of the country to sacrifice some of
its sovereignty.
(ii) There must
willingness
be sufficient economic capacity and
to fully discharge all regional
commitments.
(iii)There must be an equitable distribution of the net
gains from regionalisation.
(iv) There must be macro-economic convergence among the
individual countries.
(v) There must be institutional capacity. This refers
to the ability of an economic entity (g'overnment,
international agency, business enterprise, non-
governmental organization, etc.) to influence the
agenda of the negotiation process, to implement
agreements and commitments to achieve compliance
from partners, and t· adjust to changes in the
regional and domest.:c environment.
(vi) There must be political st abd Lic ; This condition
is for the attraction of investors into the
country's e . 'my. Matsebula further quotes the
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General Secretary of the Southern African
Development Community (SADe), Dr. Kaire Mbuende, as
having asserted that, "democracy, peace, and
security are necessary pre-requisites for
sustainable development."
(vii) There must
integrated
accommodates
be social
society is
different
integrity.
defined as
A socially
one that
and divergent individual
and group aspirations within a flexible framework
of shared basic values and common interests.
For regional economic co-operation to succeed, it is
therefore imperative that the member states make a
concerted effort to ensure that conditions set out by
Matsebula are strictly adhered to.
1.3 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION
A customs union is a regional co-operative measure that
exists where the introduction of a common external
tariff is adopted. This is beyond agreements within a
free trade area (an arrangement which allows free
movement of goods between member countries). This
process allows for the introduction of non-
differentiated customs tariffs between individual member
countries.
As a result, a common external tariff is set on goods
imported to the common customs area, and the revenue
pool emanati~g from this arrangement is controlled from
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a central place. Specific arrangements, like the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), also allow for
the inclusion of the sales and excise duty in the common
revenue pool, a condition that has brought about serious
tensions revolving around revenue sharing. Thebe
tensions will be addressed in detail in the next
c. iapt er .
At this point it is most fitting to provide a brief
historical overview of the evoLut ion of the Southern
'frican Customs Union \SACU). The Cape of Good Hope and
the Orange Free State first established SACU in 1889.
It was later joined by the Transvaal and Na"2.l (a
situation that brought the whole of Sout.h Africa into a
framework of economic co-operation). The High
Commission Protectorates that were Bot ·rana,Lesotho and
Swaziland (BLS countries) also became members of the
union.
These four countries, that: is, South Africa and BLS
countries, were later joined by Namibia in 1990, after
it had gained its independence. The membership of the
customs union as seen today was thus co~pleted in 1990,
with the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho,
the Republic of Namibia, the Kingdom of Swaziland (BLNS
countries) and the Republic of South Af:cica(RSA), as
members.
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1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE OBJECTIVES.
The stipulation of the 1969 Southern African Customs
Union Agreements (SACUA) does not allow for a condition
where the development of the poorest mernber at.at.es is
repressed while that of the more developed members is
accelerated. Mutual development of the member countries
of the Customs Union has been the basic concept and the
point of 1e~ .rture when the agreements were concluded.
However, instead of SACG developing the whole common
customs area, it is argued by Hoohlo (1990:106) that it
succeeded only in providing the member countries with
relatively cheaper commodities, available i.n unlimited
amounts, almost all produced in South Africa.
Industrial concentration in South Africa has been
detrimental to the BLNS economies, particulnrly with
regard to Lesotho. A protective trade stance by the RSA
has also adversely affected BIJNS' economic deveLopment ,
especially if it is taken into consideration that the
larger proportion of their imports originated f rornSouth
Afr:i.ca.
With the advent of democracy in 1994, the proposed study
intends to answer the question whether South Africa's
approach +o SACU has been hegemonic I and whether a
democratic South Africa will ensure leadership of SACU
member coup' ri.es to enhance mutual economi.c development
or whethGr it will maintain a hegemonic approach. The
research ie: conduct.ed f rom a South Af:I:ican point of
view.
b
The word "leadership" used in this research paper shall
be construed to mean "initiative for participative
mutual benefit" , while "hegemony" shall mean
"domination in own interest at the expense of others."
If the democratic South Africa embarks on le~ding the
development of the customs union, the possible strategic
plans towards this goal need to be carefully explored to
ensure that hegemonic power is uprooted. It should not
be forgotten that because of .~ts being an economic
superpower within SACU, South Africa is seen by other
member countries as the driving for'cc towards the
reconstitution and democratisation of SACU.
Assuming that South Africa is willing to lead the
customs union to economic prosperity without practising
hegemony, questions to be answered by this study would
be:
(i) Was South Africa's membership of SACU before 1994
more hegemonic or was it leadership orientated in
character?
(ii) Are the BLNS countries empowered to participate in
the decision making process within SACU?
(iii)What strategies can be implemented towar-ds the
economic development of the whole common customs
area?
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(iv) How can all member countries be afforded the
opportunity to explore all existing markets within
the common customs area?
(v) How can revenue shares to member countries be
equitably distributed to the satisfaction of every
SACU member?
In view of the questions
areas to be ~xplored by
tabulated above,
this research
suggested
are: the
possibility of establishing fully represerL a.tive forums
which can be entrusted with policy formulation and
recommendations towards strategic development of
whole CCA; the possibility of establishing
Secretariat for SACU administrative functions;
revisiting the competencies of revenue collection and
the
the
disbursement, etc.
1.5 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH:
The proximity of South Africa to international waters
through its harbours and the avai1c:tbilityof airports
and international transportation create a situation that
allows for international economic co-operation. This
geo-strategic position which has culminated in a well-
developed infrastructure, has anabled South Africa to
exercise economic hegemony in the Southern African
rGgion.
The inesc.a})8blareality is that three of the SACU member
countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) ire
landlocked and dependent on the South African economic
base and infrastructure. The South African ports and
harbours as well a~ the transportation network in the
Southern African region sex-ve as a gateway of the whole
common customs area to and from the entire world. The
ports and harbours available in Namibia cannot be
compar-ed with those in Sou th Africa as service providers
for SACU. One aspect of this research will be to
reflect on the development of infrastructure as an
essential precondition towards economic prosperity.
Differences among mHmber countries caused by the South
African hegemonic approach in SAeu will be dealt with in
this study. Furthermore, the research will also ma.te
valuable recommendations on ways and means of applying
effective remedies to hegemony as prevalent in SACU.
The study will contribute to the existing literature on
the Southern African Customs Union, with regard to the
dynamics of leadership.
The study reflects on the 1969 Southern African Customs
Union Ag'reement (SACUA), with specific reference to an
overview of how South Africa took advantage of these
agreements at the expense of the other member countries.
This agreement has a reflection on t.:.heoperations of
South Africa in SACU and also forms ':he basis for
explaining the relationship that existed between South
Africa and the BLNS countries.
The disadvantages caused by the absence of a Secrp.tariat
in the customs union, resulted in south Africa taking
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decisions on behalf of SACU (McCarthy, 1992: 12). These
agreements together with the absence of the Secretariat
are factors that contributed to hegemonic relationships
among SACU members. It is necessary for th8S~
re~."ltionships to be substituted by participatory
fairness in the post-1994 period.
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted in the Republic of South
Africa. The initial assumption was that the High
Commissions of the other countries would assist in
acoe ssi.nq information during interviews, only to find
that reference was made to the mother countries.
Realising that visiting the individual member countries
would be an expensive venture and also considering the
limited time frame available for the completion of this
report, a viable option was to conduct interviews with
stakeholders from South Africa only. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted with people whose names appear
on an appendix.
Questionnaires were distributed to stakeholders in the
Department of Trade and Industry (Customs Union desk),
the Reserve Bank, the Development Bank of Southern
A.frica, the Trade and Industry Secretariat, the South
African Institute of International Affairs, and the
South African Revenue Service (Customs and
Excise) (institutions located in South Africa) .
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1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH:
This research on SACU was limited by time, access to
information and funding among other things. Regarding
access to information, as the literature based on this
topic was not abundantly available in the university
libraries, this meant travelling to the Africa Institute
which is located in Pretoria.
Access to ir 'mation was also a limitation in the sense
that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) treated
some documents with very strict confidentiality, since
some customs union related issues were still being
negotiated. Fo~ example, the newly negotiated revenue
sharing for:nula could not be released for the simple
reason that negotiations had not reached a conclusion.
Only an ex;;>lanation of how it will function was
forwarded to the researcher. 'l'heonly document that
could be obtained from the DTI was on the 1969
agreement.
Little could be obtained from the Development Bank of
Southern Africa except. for an article on 'Trade
Integration in the Southern African Development
Community: Prospects and Problems', written by Mayer and
Thomas. Another document was a report on the workshop
held in Gaberone, Botswana, in March 1994. The workshop
was on Reconstituting & Democratising SACUl.
The difficult in identifying possible interviewees
involved in SACU matters from the BLNS countries cannot
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be over-emphasise~. This difficulty leG to the change of
focus on the proposed study from the viewpoint of all
the BLNS countries to the South African viewpoint. Only
South African stakeholders were interviewed.
The published work on SACU concentrated on tl"'!costE'and
benefits of members of the customs union; imp ovement of
some elements in SACUA which could benefit the BLS
countries allJ. important issues in SACU from the
historical, legal and economic perspective, but not on
the dynamics of leadership (of SoutL Africa) in
redressing the differences among the members of SACU.
1.8 SUMMARY OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 focuses on the review of literature based on
inter-state relations within the customs union before
the 1994 elections in South Africa. The focus is cn the
objectives of SACUA: This chapter will mainly review
Lnt.e r-vat.at.erelations within SACU under the following
headings: participation in decision-making of the
customs union; economic development of the common
customs area; free interchange of goods among the member
countries; and sharing of equitable benefits among
members of the customs union. This chapter concentrates
on the pre-1994 period since this period forms the basis
for argument in the post 1994 period, and because very
little has been written abo~t the latter period, except
that the focus was on renegotiations of the agreement.
The chapter also reviews in brief the suggested
solutions to SACU related problems from a South African
12
point of view.
CHAPTER 3 focuses on the research questions and details
of the research methodology in accordance with the
literature review. In this chapter semi-structured
interviews and quest Lorn, .xes are clarified as important
research tools for this study. Methods of collecting and
analysing data are outlined in this chapter.
Chapter 4 presents data collected through questionnaires
as well as semi-structured interviews and also analyses
and interpret:s responses from interviewees related to
research questions.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and recommendations
based on both the literature review as well as data
collected through the semi-structured interviews and
questionnaire respondents. The chapter will also test
whether the research question was adequately answered.
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CHAPTER TWO
2. LITERATURE REVIEW:
2.1 Introduction.
Unlike the Front Line StatEs, which from the stal.thad a
political motive aimed at the liberation of Southern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South ~.frica, SACD from
1889, when it was founded, had an economic motive. In
general it was aimed at free movement of goods between
the member count ri.es and the introduction of a common
external tariff against non-members. As this research
develops it will be realised that underneath the
economic intentions CJf SACU t.here were hidden political
agendas.
SADCC, formed after the liberation of Rhodesia, had an
economic motive. According to Matsebula (1996: 9) SADCC
had its objectives as: reduction of dependence on other
countries in general an6 on South Africa in particular;
creation of an operational and equitable regional
arrangement; mobilisation of own resources to implement
national, inter-state and regional policies; and jo~nt
action to secure international understanding of, and
practical support for, the SADCC initiative.
2.1..1 Objectives drawn out of the 1969 SACU agreements.
According to the 1969 SACUA preamble, the agreement had
four features such as:
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(i) Free interchange of goods between member
countries.
(ii) Applying the common external tariff.
(iii)Encouraging the development of less advanced
members and the diversification of their economies.
(iv) Affording all parties equitable benefits arising
from trade among themselves and with other
countries.
Mut:.ualdevelopment of member states seems to be the
driving force towards regional economic co-operation
arrangements. Reacting to this statement Stewart and
McCarthy (1995: 404) argue that the Southern African
region has third world characteristic features. For
instance, there are unequal levels of economic growth
and production between the countries, and the region is
highly dependent on the developed regional sub-cantre
(e.g. South Africa) and the well dev~loped outside
world. This situation results in a concentration of
indt:.strial development in the most developed member
countries (e.g. Sr ~h Africa) .
They further argue that the problem of regional co-
operation is not only an economic problem relating to
development, efficiency and other technical concepts,
but is also rooted in a political problem of
considerable complexity. They furthermore state t:hat
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the selection of an economic co-operation model for
Southern _.,'trica (here referring to SACU or SADC) , should
not be technically, mechanically and politically
oriented. It is argued that:
"Southern Africa has not yet reached levels of
technical and political maturicy which are
necesaaz-yfor a market based integration, albeit
the development-oriented variety. The condition of
sacrifice of sovereignty and advanced technical and
institu~ional capabilities cannot be met in most of
the countries concerned. Looser and more flexible
approaches wnich make smaller technical and
political demands are more likely to be
fruitfu1."(Stewart & McCarthy, 1995: 406)
2.1.2 INTEGRATION OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES:
Elaborating on the prerequisites and characteristics of
a good regional co-operation structure, McCarthy (1992:
6) argues that the static gains from regional economic
1-operatjon ciyise if within the common customs area,
trade creation (Lhe substitution of low cost for high
cost products in consumption) exceeds trade diversion
(the substitution of high cost for low cost goods) .
Explaining the dynamics of trade creation as related to
trade diversion, McCarthy (1992: 6) argues that the room
for trade creation will be relatively large if foreign
trade of custom union members is relatively smaller than
domestic trade, and furthermore, if a high proportion of
external trade is already taking place with custom union
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par:ners. Since foreign trade is small compared to
domestic products, more scope exists for the replacement
of high cost products by less expensive imports from
customs union partners. Also, since trade with non-
union members is small, the l:ikelihood of diverting
trade from :"ow-cost non-union products to high-cost
union products is unlikely. It is said that such trade
patterns are not characteristic of developing economies,
since in these developing economies the range of
manufactured goods is dissimilar; the economies are
complementary rather than competitive, and this creates
a room for trade diversion.
McCarthy (1992: 7) further says that "Manufacturing is
regarded as the driving force towards economic
development and regional integration, the larger market
thus created is seen as an opportunity to st irnuLa
industrial growth in an environment that is neither
autarkic nor free trade."
2.1.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RSA and ELNS countries
Concentrating on the relationships existing among member
states within SACU, Hoohlo (1990: 95-96) argues that the
less complementary and the more competitive the
economies of the member countries, the more likely will
the customs union be successful in creating trade.
South Africa is more economically advanced compared to
other countries in the region, thus their (BLNS)
economies tend to be complementary to RSA economy. This
results in a concentration of development in South
17
Africa.
The complementary nature of these economies is evidenced
by the supply of rdW materials or intermediate goods
from the BLNS courrtrLes into South African industries,
and in return the exportation of end products back to
the BLNS countries. Apartheid South Africa, realising
its economic strength because of trade features
mentioned above, resorced to a hegemonic approach
towards other member countries in SACU, as is argued
below.
The advan~age taken by RSA over the BLNS countries do~s
not only derive from the trade patterns mentioned above
but also from the 1969 SACUA.. These agreements
empowered South Africa to make 6ecisions on behalf of
the BLNS countries. SACUA states that IIthe custom
tariff and duties and the sales duties as in frrce in
South Africa from time to time shall be applied to goods
imported into t.he common customs area from outside that
area. II Also in the agreement it is stated that "any
rebates, refunds and drawbacks or sales duties on
imported goods shall be identical to any such rebates,
retunds and drawbacks in force in South Africa. II
(Article 4(2) of 1969 SACUA)
From the statements mentioned above it is deduced that
the economic and trade practices of the BLNS countries
should replicate that of South Africa although the
levels ot economic development between south Africa and
the BLNS countries are uneven. This practice of doing
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as South At ri.ca does, arouses doubts about the
innovative character of the BLNS countries, and also
exposes the hegemonic power RSA exercised on the BLNS
countries.
Concerned about the vertical relationshJ.p prevalent in
SACU KUmar (1992: 2) maintains that the co-operation of
the BLNS countries is maintained by their inability to
match the South African strong economic base. A further
:r.eflection on the South African hegemonic approach
towards the BLNS states is the agreement which provided
that the laws relating to customs and excise duties
shall be the same in the member countries as are in
force in South Africa.
Further eLaborat.Lno on the power South Africa wielded,
Isaksen (1993: 189) alleges that the apartheid South
Africa had both political and economic advantages in
SACU. He cited t ae fact that in political terms the
Apartheid State was able to argue internationally that
it had very cordial relations with a number of African
states. Economically, its total revenue share amounted
to four times that of the BLNS countries combined. This
contributed to the rise"'in South Africa's GDP from the
extended '·rade markets established within t.he common
customs area, regardless of the economic sanctions posed
against scuch Africa by the international world.
Accessing extended South African trade markets to BLNS
oount i Les could have fost,_red mutual economi,c
development of all SACU countries. This could have been
a viable solution to the existing problem of skewed
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industrial development to South Africa.
Maasdorp (1994: 19) raises BLNS concern about: the time
lag in revenue payments as it means that they are always
owed money by the common pool and thereby "are making an
interest free loan to South Africa" i the inadequate
provision for the protection of their infant industries;
the weakness in the treatment of dumping (where
industries move subsidised commodities across the
borders, selling them at cheaper prices with the aim of
suppressing emzrging industries of the other countries) i
and the inadequate machinery for consultation. These are
some of the concerns that bring about tensions between
South Africa on one side and the BLNS countries on the
other sid~.
Focusing on the relationships that exist between RSA on
one hand and Lesotho and Sw~ziland on the other hand,
Isaksen (1993: 191) argues that it is doubtful whether
the relationship between South Africa, Lesotho and
SwaziL.tnd will change since this is strengthened by
economic ties. Lesotho haa no other international
boundaries except with South Africa. This link between
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland brings about doubts
as to whether the BLS countries had a common negotiating
stance during the 1969 negotiations on SACUA. Swaziland
and Lesotho are two countries that depend on South
African industrial production and exports as well as a
massive revenue shares from the common pool.
The dependence of SWRziland on RSA is evidenced by the
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report from the Times of Swaziland dated 14.08.19%
(p.14) in which the Deputy Commissioner of Customs and
Excise, Mr. Dlamini, reported that: "SACCI is an
important source of levenue to Swaziland, and is
expected to cor~ribute 52,5% of total Swaziland revenue
in 1996/97 budget. 1/ Furthermore he said that the
country is not considering any change in its membership
of SACU, but is seeki:::1.gimprovements in t:he SAeu
agreement. According to Dlamini the collection and
distribution of revenue by Sout-.hAfrica was not a
problem and he wished that the modus operandi should
continue.
Business Day, a South African newspaper, dated 12.08.94,
reported that if the payouts from the common revenue
pool (which contribute to half of Lesotho's budgetary
revenue) were tampered with, South Africa should expect
half of the Lesotho population migrating to Botshabelo
in South Africa. This migration would also be
exacerbated by the 25% drop in the number of miners
recruited from Lesotho and the political instability in
that country.
2.2 Fres inter~hange of goods among membe.r countries
As already explained, rv:a.tsebula.(1996: 2) argue,s that
trade creation occurs when production is reallocated
from high cost to low cost member countries, and trade
diversion occurs when imports are switched from low cost
sources in the rest of the world to high cost partner
sources (t.he Lat ter is also referred to as a price-
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raising eHeet) .
Emphasising trade relations, Maasdorp (1990: 12)
argues that economic co-operation should occur
also
only
among countries that are at roughly similar levels of
development and, in particular among those whose
protected industries prior to the union were
competitive. This means that the member countries should
be producing similar types of manufactured goods. The
competitive nature of the econonies then leads to trade
being created within the union, whi Le imports from the
rest of the world iD other goods continue so that little
or no trade diversion occurs.
Stewart and McCarthy (1995: 403) refer to the kind of
integrative measures mentioned by Maasdorp as a
development-orie1ted market integration which is
explained by an approach that is "focused on the dynamic
elements of mar~!t integration, that ia the creation of
larger markets within which firms can benefit from
economies of scale and competition." In their vie;w trade
diversion is explained as a neo-classical model which is
"considered as a negative, static outcome of
integration, presented in the dynamic guise of import
substituting industrialisation within the larger market
of the region." They continue to say that solutions to
this kind of approach demand unrealistic levels of
political commitment and high levels of technical and
administrative expertise that are not available in
developing economies.
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From the statements made by both Maasdorp and Matsebula
above, it would appear that SACU is characterised by the
complementary nature of economies between the member
countries which encourage the price raising effects
(i.e. Sout' Africa effecting prices higher than world
standard prices to other member countries) .This explains
the origin of problems in SACD which led to the tensions
mentioned in this research report.
Focusing on the interchange of goods between SACD member
countries, Mayer and Thomas (1997: 331) state that
intraregional trade volumes in Southern Africa are
concentrated in the SAeu countries. They relate that in
terms of South Africa's eXforts to the Southern African
region (which account for 19% of total exports) I close
to 70% ~s destined in SACD member countries. Five of the
7 point percentages of South Africa's imports sourced
from the region come from SACD countries. This is a
feature that explains the economic imbalances occurring
within the parameters of SACU.
Davies (1994: 5), arguing about the economic
significance of SACU to South Africa, indicates that the
latter's GDP is high because of its secured membership
of the customs union. He refers to McFarland (1983)
saying that trade which the BLNS countries contributed,
was responsible for 27% of new value added and for
around 67 000 new jobs ~n South Africa's manufacturing
sector.
This argument illustrates that South African industries
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accrued a lot of income from the extended trade markets
of the BLNS countries and ultimately South Africa raised
its GDP through taxes. There 1.3 a supporting statement
that "The extent to which South African exports to BLNS
countries would fall, if the BLNS countries left SACU,
is unknown, but even if it were small, the remaining
exports would be subject to uncert.ainty over possible
variations in the BLNS external trade regime, which
would deter investment in South Africa" (Walters, 1989:
49). This means that the BLNS countries still hold a
consumer power over South Africa even if she holds the
concentration of industrial development.
Davies (1994: 3) states that the agreement based on the
protection of infant industries was revoked by a (no
longer) secret memorandum which was negotiated in 1970s,
which stated that such protection will only be
forthcoming if any new industry aiming at exploring
extended markets in SACU countries meets "the
qualitative requirements of the common customs area
[i.e. overcome a range of regulatory barriers] and...[be]
in a position to supply at least 60% of the quantitative
requirements of the area. /I To the BLNS countries this
implied that South Africa wanted to dominate the
available markets within the common customs area without
competition. This tension is brought about by the fact
that most of the emerging industries from the BLNS
countries could not meet such standards.
Referring to Article 11 (5) of SACUA which states that
"The contracting parties shall co-operate in the
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application of import restrictions with a view to
ensuring that the economic object:ives of any import
control legislation in any country in the common customs
area are attained, II this means that free movement of
goods is overshadowed by the sovereignty of the member
states.
In exposing the tensions caused by this Article, Kumar
(1990: 44) argues as follows:
\\South Africa is completely free to enact any kind of
import control legislation it likes and pursue such
economic objectives as are best suited to its economy at
any time. There is no machinery for co-ordination in this
regard no requirements of even a rudimentary
example, cou Ld be,
African non-tariff barriers,
and are, enacted into
for
such
consultation. south
legislations. The infant and new industries in the BLNS
countries are then forced to comply with and often meet a
swift death, particularly if their products aim at
penetrating the South African market.II
This argument is supported by Davies (1994: 5) who
states that instead of the protectionism characterising
the arrangement applied on imports from outside the SAeD
area into the BLNS countries, there have been elements
of protectionism 'Cowards imports into South Africa from
the BLNS countries. Hence the development plans of the
BLNS countries could not be realised because of these
restrictions.
This view is supported by a statement that the BLNS
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countries "had little scope for using foreign trade
policy to influence economic development, and South
Africa has on occasions been reluctant to provide access
to the BLNS countries for exports to South African
markets " (Davies et al. 1993: 27-28). The two arguments
mentioned above, explain how the Articles of the 1969
agreement were disregarded by South Africa and how she
exercised hegemonic power over the BLNS countries.
To explain further how South
disadvantage to the BLNS and how
Africa was of a
she suppressed their
development initiatives, one needs to mention that the
incentives South Africa introduced had adverse effects
on the BLNS countries. An example of such incentives is
the General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS), which
compensated those South African industries involved in
the exportation of goods. South Africa also made
available incentives for those industries that relocate
in the TBVC areas, but made it clear that those
industries from the BLNS countries wishing to relocate
in the said areas will not receive incentives. Even if
the arrangement did not cover up the BLNS based
industries, some companies from the BLNS resettled in
the Transkel, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC
axeas ) .
Mayer & Zarenda (1994: 38) give an example of the
Metalware Manufacturers from the Matsapa Industrial Site
in Swaziland that relocated in Boput.hatswana , leaving
130 Swazi people unemployed. These strategic plans by
South Africa were all directed towards a concentration
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of economic development in South Africa, neglecting BACU
agreements.
Reflecting on the importance of BLNS membership in SACU,
it is argued that if the BLNS countries were outside the
SACU agreements, they would benefit 1m the lower
import prices and exercise control over t r.e tariff
policy, but would not have assured access to South
African markets. Focusing on dependence of the BLNS
countries on South Africa, it is argued that "the BLNS
countries were all the years preoccupied with the
revenue distribution mechanism rather than economic co-
operation and development" (Isaksen, 1993:189).
There is also an argument that for SAeu to compete with
other regional integrative blocks (e.g. European Union)
there should be mutual development of member countries
to an extent that their economies can be compe cd t Lve
rather than complementary. The most important questlon
at the moment is how can the Southern African Customs
Union be developed to the required standard without one
of the member countries taking advantage of the others.
2.3 Economic development of the commo~ customs area.
An objective included in the 1969 SACU agreement states
that, it is the duty of all members of S\CU "to ensure
continued economic development of t.he custom union area
as a whole. And Ln particular to encourage the
development of the less advanced members of the customs
union and the diversification of their industries" (SACUA
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Preamble, 1996: 1), The realisation of this objective is
highly questionable, From the available literature it
would appear that the economic development c.f the common
customs area was one-sided, with South Africa benefiting
from such membership,
Maasdorp (1990: 2~1 argues that an important factor in
any economic integration is that the member countries
should be in some considerable agreement as to economic
philosophy. Philosophical differences can lead to the
reasoning that those countries with policies attractive
to investors will develop more rapidly than others, and
thus benefits of integration will not be shared. Funds
will move to countries with lower taxation rates, more
favourable exchange control policies etc.
Because of the concentration of industrial development
in South Africa, Maasdorp argues that there should be
change of focus towards the development of the entire
cu.stoms area, if the envisaged development strategy will
help in competing economies within SACU. SouLh Africa
being the economic giant in the region, should sacr.i..fice
some of its sovereignty and clear the development path
for all SACU m~mbers.
McCarthy (1994' 175-177) explains the problem of skewed
industrial development as deriving from the economies of
unequal size and different levels of development, He
mentions that in economic co-operation of unequal
countries, the small economies are given the opportunity
of escaping the confines of small domestic markets by
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producing for a larger unified market, which in practice
entails exporting to larger member countries. This would
be an advantage for BLNS countries exporting to South
Africa.
He further argues that small economies usually lack thp.
capacity, especially industrial skills and
entrepreneurial capabilities, to produce goods
marketable to larger and usually more developed member
countries. This leads to larger member ..:ountries
benefiting because of lack of compe t Lt Lou , The situation
ultimately led to concentration of economic growth and
trade diversion. He explains that the higher prices
resulting from trade diversion imply that the
industrially less advanced member states are subsidisl.ng
the industrial development of the industrially more
advanced member states.
l"lcCarthycites two ways .1.1 whit 1 the problem of skewed
growth can be addressed that is by imposing limited
tariffs on imports from a partner state, or compensatory
transfer payments from the more developed to the less
developed member. He says the two measures are not meant
to correct the unequal distribution of industrial
investments but to compensate for industrial
concentration, without directly addressing the cau.ie of
skewed development. The developing countries may then
revert to a distributi ve £"trategy based on planned
regional industrial development frequently supported by
a regional development bank. He says regional planning
should be effective in addressing the equity issues.
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.stewart ann McCarthy (199:": 405-406) arque that the
Southern African region (with SACU as part thereof) is
not sufficiently politically and technically mature to
opt for market-based models of integration because:
e The basic requir(~ment8 for orthodox customs union are
not satisfied. The participating countries are not at
similar levels of development; their industrial
sectors are net competitive; they have no potential
to develop existing cornplemeritar-y +nduatriaI sectors;
and external trade does not t~ke place mainl V =monq
the prospective union members
o The levels of policy harmonisation, which would be
necessary, are neither political nor technically
feasible.
o Measures to counteract polar~sed development are
unlikely to be practicable on technical and political
gr-ounds.
o The sacrifices of sovereignty implied by the common
body of community law which would be necessary to
regulate the activities of complex ma:t:ket based
schemes, are likely t.o be regarded ~ excessive by
member countries.
o It will be difficult fer Southern Africa to achieve
trade liberalisation whieh is the most basic component
of market-based ache ."es.
e The size of the regional market is insufficient to
support the scale economies.
o The wide ideological disagreement, which may from time
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to time arise in Southern Africa, could be problematic
within formal and close-knit market-based systems.
o The general developing-country production and trade
structures that predominate within the region, and the
extreme inequality in economic development levels,
would limit the achic:vements of the rapid gains
necessary for system stability and durability.
The dependence cf South Africa on extended BLNS markets,
the inclusion of the stabilisation and enhancement
factors in the r'evem-e sharing formu1 a as cornponaatLon
for adverse economic effects, and the introduction of
the secret memorandum to protect industrial development
in South Africa, are all indicators of a hegemonic
approach to BLNS countries. This has resulted in a
concentration of development in South Africa caused by
unequal economic development among the member countries,
the unwillingness to sacrifice political sovereignty by
member countries, and lack of harmonisation of economic
policies.
The Lnab.i Li t.y of the BLNS countries to develop and
increase Lndus tr.i.aL production for the extended trade
markets in South Africa, resulted in concentration of
development in South Africa, with BLNS countries putting
their interests around revenue shares increased by the
compensation from South Africa, rather than
concentrati ng on aggressive development of their
countries.
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The fiscal discretion given to South Africa by the BLNS
count.ries in determining the common cu .rom duties, as
well as in controlling the revenue pool and uetermining
the revenue sharing formula, is also a clear indication
of hegemonic power over the Customs Union by South
Africa. The latter also unilaterally raised the prices
of her commodities within the common customs area
without consultation with the other members in an
attempt to match the world standard prices. This factor
also contributed to economic domination.
However, while the BLNS countries complain that South
Africa has been enriched by economic co-operation, South
Africa feels that the stabilisation and the enhancement
factors included in the revenue sharing formula, which
advantages the BLNS countries, when it (South Africa)
receives only the residual from the revenue pool, makes
its membership of SACU very expensive.
Regardless of the tensions mentioned above which are
prevalent in the customs union, there is not a single
country intending to withdraw its membership of SACU.
Stoneham (1994: 6) states that the RSA understood that
lithe BLNS count· es are striving to
establish a financial situation for themselves which
does not leave them in a worse position than under
independent circumstances outside the customs union. II
With very little development plans existing in the BLNS
countries and with a concentration of industry towards
South Africa, Kamur (1990: 2)argues that SACU has thus
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often been seen as a pragmatic trade and payments
arrangement among a particular group of countries with a
very specific history, rather than an integration
scheme, in ei cher the European Community or developing
country moulds.
The Development Bank of Southern Africa, realising that
economic development has been skewed towards South
Africa at the expense of other member countries I has
made a recommendation that: "any fl1ture restructuring
strategy undertaken by a new South African government
covering development, industrialisation, labour or trade
has to take into account the effects on other members of
SACU. It must also analyse the capacity of the BLNS to
supply raw materials, intermediate inputs and even
competing consumer goods to South African markets and
attempt to foster linkages between economic sectors
across the region. For this programme, more democratic
institutional structures should be established in key
decision-making areas, increased research into the needs
of participating members undertaken and improved current
statistics made available." (Marina. M & Zarenda. H,
1994: preambJ.e).
From this recommendation it ~an be realised chat from
the DBSA viewpoint South Africa is the coun.try having
the solution to problems prevalent in SACU, and a
balanced development strategy for the entire region is
crucial to the success of the future economic
development for every member of SACU.
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2.4 Participation in decision-making
It would appear that the area of BLNS participation in
decision making received very little attention from the
apartheid South African gOVE:.nment;, because unilateral
decisions were taken and imposed on the BLNS countries
without adequate time for consultation. A paper
presented by Stoneham at a workshop held in Botswana
(1994: 14) indicates that the recommendation made by the
Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT) to the South African
governmen'.:,could not be changed regardless of inputs
made by the BLNS countries.
The removal of the BLNS from decision-making arenas is
evidenced by the fact that the customs union does not
have a permanent secretariat, but depends on South
Africa as the principal party in the administration of
SACU: the common external tariff is determined by South
Africa with the Board of Trade and Tariffs acting as the
tariff investigating body for SACD (McCarthy,1992: 12).
This Board, as a private sector, is also used to make
recommendations to the RSP..guvernment on changes to
industrial and trade policies. (Stoneham, 1994: 14).
One other aspect that needs attention is the fact that
the BLNS countries were supposed to implement the same
excise and sal .., duties in the very way Sout.h Africa
did. This implles that the decision implemented by South
Africa locally VJould be effected in the BLNS countries
witholt questioning. Consultation with other member
countries was minimal. This could be realised when South
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Africa decided on the introduction of the General Sales
Tax (GST) and the Value Added Tax (VAT) without
consulting with other member countries. This was
regarded as decisions taken "outside the scope of the
agreementn• (Isaksen, 1993: 183).
Issues revolving around the time lag before revenue
shares were distributed to the member countries were a
decision of South Africa without cons~lting with other
countries. This decision had adverse effects since it
took two years before revenue shares could be
redistributed.
For the fact that no country intends to quit the customs
uni.on, it means th these tensions can be aJdressed by
review1.ng the objectives of the 1969 Southern African
Customs Union agreement (SACUA) and by investigating
whether these objectives have been satisfied or not. If
not, then what role can South Africa and the BLNS
countries play in ensuring that the said objectives are
redressed with the view of reconst it.uting and
democratising the customs union.
Arguments made above point to a situat.ion where it: is
realised that the agreements made by the member
countries in 1969, with regard to the development of the
less advanced countries in the customs union, were
f avouz Lnq :..rut h Africa at the expense of the BLNS
countries and that negotiations are necessary for
changing these agreements.
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2.5 The revenue shares:
To demonstrate that South Africa exercised a lot of
economic power and hegemony over the BLNS countries, one
has to look into the collection, control and
distribution of the revenue pool of SACU to the
different member countries. Hoohlo (1990: 94) explained
the pool "as a collection of all customs, excise, sales
and all trade related duties collected in the customs
union. South Africa is the custodian of the pool. The
agreement does not
between collection
therefore collects
specify how these should be used,
and disbursement. II South Africa
the duties into its consolidated
revenue fund , and BLNS shares are paid from this fund.
This explains why the RSA solely took over the
responsibility of collection from and redistributi8n of
funds to individual member countries.
All recommendations on the rate of tariffs were the
responsibility of BTT and the revenue sharing formula
was unilaterally determined by the RSA government,
although Article 5 of the SACU agree~ent provides the
BLNS countries 'adequate opportunity' for consultation
b8fore imposing, amending or abrogating any custom duty
with respect to goods imported in~o the common customs
area (Government Notice No. 2584, 1969: 4). Without
doubt, South Africa was Ln direct, violation of the
agreement related to the revenue sharing formula.
Stoneham (1994: 14) states that the advantage taken by
South Africa on the BLNS countries does not depict a
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healthy relationship amongst the member countries. It
demonstrates the reliance and dependence of other member
countries on South Africa. South Africa made use of its
own institutions to undercut the SACU members with
regard to decision making.
2 • 5 • 1 THE REVENUE SHARING FORM'UL s.
Article 14 of the 1969 agreement deals with the formula
for determining the respective revenue shares of
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in the common revenue
pool. This formula was also used to Q0termine the
revenue shares for Namibia after it had joined the
customs union in 1990. The DBSA expressed the formula in
the following way:
R (i + p) C + E + S (1,42)
1 + P
In this formula:
R is the revenue received by Botswana, Lesotho or
SwazilRnd.
I is the value at the border of all imports into
Botswana or Lesotho or Swaziland or Namibia
inclusive of customs, excise and sales duties.
L is the value at the border of all imports into the
customs union area inclusive of customs and sales
duties.
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P is the total value of dutiable goods prcduced and
consumed in Botswana or Lesotho or Swaziland or
Namibia inclusive of duties.
P is the total value of dutiable goods produced and
consumed in the customs union area inclusive of
duties.
C is the total collection of customs duties within
the customs union area.
E is the total collection of exc i se duties within
the customs union area.
S is the total collection of sales duties within the
customs union area.
N.B.:p and P in the formula, exclude any export of
domestically produced excisable and sales duty
goods that benefit from export drawbacks. (Mayer &
Zarenda, 1994: 13-14)
Isaksen (1993: 185) argues that the advantage taken by
South Africa in SACUis apparent especially where South
Africa, after negotiations, decided t.o fix the
compensation rat.e at 42% on the revenue shares of the
individual member countries in order to protect its
Macro-Economic Policy. Despite the fact that the
allocation of the revenues from the pool should be
related to the value of dutiable goods imported (for
custom duties), and those produced or consumed (for
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excise duties), the revenue share of each of the BLNS
countries that is multiplied by 1.42 because of the 42%
extra share, is said to be compensation to the BLNS
countries for:
2.5.1.1. The 'pri~e raising effects' on imports from
South Africa into the BLNS countries of a tariff system
designed to protect South African producers from
international price competition. Although South Africa
is to blame for the price raising effects that are
detrimental to the BLNS countries, it should also be
remembered that lack of economic competiveness among the
member countries cause this type of situation.
2.5.1.2 The 'industrial concontl.a.tiol'leffects, resulting
from the tendency of industries serving the SAeD market
to locate in South Africa. Although this turns to be an
adverse effect on the BLNS countries, it should not be
forgotten that invest.ors turn to be interested in
putting their inv~stments in countries with the correct
infrastructure. Hence the attraction of indusL.ry to
South Africa is not only because of the adverse policies
South Africa adopted, but also because of the attractive
infrastructure prevailing in South Africa.
Lundahl and Peters son (1991: 369)argue that the
concentration of industrial development in the core
white areas of South Africa, has given rise to si.x
effects which are detrimental to the BLNS countries:
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(i) It has Lncr-eaaed the price of imports into the
BLNS countries.
(ii) The BLNS countries lose production factors to
South Africa, especially those which could be used
in the production of industrial goods in these
countries.
(iii)Agricultural production (particularly in Lesotho)
has declined as a result of the vast migration of
labour to South Afr~ca.
(iv) Through the agglomeration of economies of scale,
the areas which were developed first in the customs
union can secure a permanent monopoly, should it be
given free trade and free factor movement within
the region. Production costs are thus lower in
South Africa than in the BLNS countries by virtue
of South Africa's position as the most developed
area Lr. the customs union.
(v) Concentration of industry is further reinforced
when, (from the demand side), consumers in the BLNS
countries prefer goods which are traditionally
imported from South Africa, even if there are no
price or quality differences between domestic and
imported goe-ds.
(vi) The BLNS countries can only embark on very limited
industrial strategies because they have sacr:ficed
the proterlive aspects normally associat2d with the
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use of tariffs, fiscal policy and monetary policy
in terms of SACU agreement. This obviously
contributed to skewed industrial development in the
region.
2.5.1.3, The 'loss of fiscal discretion' by BLNS due to
the fact that South Africa retained the right to set
tariffs and excise rates for t.he entire SACU (World
Bank, 1992: 31).
Regardless of the adverse factors mentioned above,
subsequent actions by the South African government
exacerbated and added to the adverse effects. subsidies
to South African industry and the resulting disincentive
to peripheral countries from a number of policies were
implemented by the South African government,
particularly the decentralisation policy and General
Export Incentive Scheme. Because related clauses in the
SACU treaty, prevent the BLNS countries from exploiting
the large South African market, this undermined one of
the potential benefits of SACU membe rsh.cp t.o these
countries.
South Africa complained that its membership is be-torni.nq
too expensive because cf the compen sat.Lon and
enhancement factor included in the revenue sharing
formula. Regardless of this complaint it is argued that
the negotiators of the BLS countries seem ~o have not
understooc" the implications of the stabilisCtt~on fa::t:or
of the revenue sharing formula. It is said that: they
seemed to believe that stabilising the rate of duty that
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is applied to BLS impo=ts is equivalent to stabilising
the flow of BLS revenue from a well-defined common
revenue pool. On the other hand, South Afri~a,
understanding the implications of the changes proposed
by the BLS countries, accepted the proposals in good
faith and gained the freedom which it had previously not
enjoyed that is, how much to cc,•.trLbuce to the common
revenue pool. (Guma, 1990: 75).
As mentioned before, the two year lag in payment of SAeD
revenue ef f ect.Lve Ly diminished the compensation of the
enhancement and stabilisation factors in the revenue-
sharing formula (Mayer, M & Zarenda, H. 1994: 32) .Thr
time spent before the BLNS countries could get their
nues created the cash flow problems in the BLNS
countries when South Africa enjoyed interest from money
belonging to other member countries. The late arrival of
these shares would make the rer.:eivedmoney lose value
because of inflation rates.
1~e agreement ty the BLNS countries to this offer of
compensation demonstrates the power Souch Africa has on
the SAeu member countries. There is a complaint from the
BLNS countries about the inclusion of the eycise rates
in the revenue sharing formula. Alth('JUght.b: complaint
is genuine beCBlse excise ra~es deprive the citiLens of
total taxes on consumables within thair country, it is
merely indicative of the desire by these count rLes to
maximisc their revenue share, and, on the other hand, of
the advantage caker, l"'lySOl'th Africa of the BLNS
countries. This advantage callbe jllustrated by th._;fact
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that despite the agrs:ement on common external tariff,
and the excise duties, South Africa introduced the
General Sales Tax (GST) and the Value Added Tax (VAT)
without consulting o~her member countries. The economic
significance of SACD can be seen ap an arrangement in
which South Africa acquired captive markets in the BLNS
countries in return for its disproportionate by low
shares of the revenue pool. (Davies, 1994: 5).
Regardless of the adverse effects mentioned above,
pulling out of SACD has hardly been considered a
desirable option by either South Africa or the BLNS
countries. The most important consideration is whether
other SAeD member countries are enjoying the same
benefits of being parties of the SAeD agreemer.t and are
receiving their worth without being disadvantaged by the
domination of South Africa. Should South Africa still
continue taking advantage of the poverty stricken member
states in SAeD?
The democratisation of South Africa has brought with it
expectations of a more meaningful and prospELoUS
Southern African regional economic co-opr.ratjon and
integration. Since the establishment of SAeD, and the
J.ncorporation of Botswana, Lesotho and Swa2iland after
1889, and ultimately Namibia in 1990, the people of the
regiC'~ have been grappling with the hegemonic tendencies
practised by the apartheid South Africa. The yearning
for reconstitution and democratisation of the customs
union depended largely on the outcome of the multiparty
direct negotiations and the dawning of a majority rule
43
in South Africa. According to the Lusaka decLar at.Lon
mads under the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Conference (SADCC), it was agreed that, II no
country wishes to be economically dominated by another
country.1I This is the attitude that should be taken by
SACU in trying to democratise the union.
2.6 TOWARDS THE SOLUTION
The Vice President and Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning in Botswana, Mr. Festus Mogae, in a preamble of
the report of the workshop held in Gaberone in Mar ch ,
1994, stated that the purpose of the workshop was to
inform the democratic movement (in the RSA) and their
parties about the issues relating to SACU, including the
identification of negot.iable points and the
consideration of modalities which would assist in the
reconstitution and democratisation of SACU (Mogae,
1994) .
Whilst thinking of the reconstitution and
democratisation of SACU, one wonders if the democratic
South Africa will give its full
democratisation ..Jolicy of SACU, or
at.tention
if it
to the
will be
preoccupied with its own Reconstruction and Developm~nt
Programme (RDP). This is because the collapse of the
apartheid regime also ca'ls for a concentration on the
reorganisation of South Africa in its entirety. What may
happen more rapidly is a ch~nge in the formal
l.nstitutional links among the member countries. This ma}
result in the establishm~nt of the Secretariat, a duty
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which was solely in the hands of South Africa. The
establishment of the Secretariat, if it happens, elicits
a number of questions which need to be addressed in
order to avoid problems of the past (McCarthy, 1992: 12)
Consid-".ing the gross migration of people from SACU
member countries into the South African boundaries, it
is envisaged that the strong link between ANC and the
Unions is likely to be important in decisions pertaining
to reg~onal labour migration (Isaksen, 1993: 190). This
migration has economic implications on the South
African labour market, because this causes unemployment
in the country. This factor also needs attention when
illegal immigration is discussed within SACU
negotiations. While discussing the question of illegal
immigration, attention should also be paid to the
concentration of industries in south Africa (Mayers, M &
Zarenda, H.,1994: 36) which pose an incentive to peoplA
living within the BLNS countries to look for employment
in South Africa.
Davies (1996: 2), after exploring the relations between
South Africa and the BLNS countries, mentions that the
promotion of growth and development in a democratic
South Africa depends on access to regional resources and
infrastructure, as well as on co-operation with various
sectors. He says that South Africa ]oes not only survive
because of its stronger productive base, but also
because of the protective tariff and non-protective
barriers of various kinds that kept goods produced in
regional states out of trade within South African
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markets. He says South Africa can not hope to become an
island of prosperity in a sea of poverty.
He goes on to say that Southern Africa should ccmmand
top priorities in South Africa's foreign policy and that
the country should act with its partners to promote
growth and development throughout Southern Africa.
After exploring all the areas of hegemonic approach and
advantage taken by the apartheid South Africa on the
BLNS (.!ountries,one needs to explore suggested solutions
for the tensions mentioned in this chapter. This is a
manner of finding out what different authors say about
the future prospects of SAeD and how the problems
created by South Africa, through domination can be
solved.
Mayer & Zarenda (1994: 46)argue that the first option
towards the future trends of SAeD is that it remains as
it is. Lundahl and Pet.eraaon (1991: 402), focusing on the
dependence of Lesotho on South Africa, feel that any
deepening of SAeD relations will also deepen the
dependence of Lesotho on South Africa. For Lesotho, SAeD
should remain as it is. Mayer & Zarenda further say that
many analysts do not support this option because it is
felt to be a short-term arrangement. This is argued in
the sense that there is pressure from the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GA~T) to reduce tariffs
and eliminate quantitative restrictions, which will have
adverse effects if adhered to. The reduction of tariffs
may even reduce the revenue shares allocated to the five
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member countries of SACD a condition which could make
South Africa withdraw the stabilisation and enhancement
factor.
On tariff reduction, Business Day, dated 21.06.1994,
states that the Minister of Trade and Industry, Trevor
Manuel, mentioned that he was in favour of implementing
reduction of tariffs as called for by GftTT "as soon as
possible." This tariff reduction is not viewed as
cont.xLbut Lnq to the reduction of the revenue pool.
On the contrary, Davies (1994: 11-12) argues thc~ with
the reduction of tariffs, the BLNS countries may replace
more exp.sns Lve South African imports with cheaper goods
from elS'3where. He says that this may complicate cost-
benefit calculations and hence SACDA negotiations. In
addition he says that a democratic South Africa's
acceptance as a full and open trading partner will
increase pressures to comply more fully with
international trading norms. This is viewed as a
solution to the trade tensions of the past SACU.
As tne second option there is a feeling that SACU should
collapse and countries should start working towards the
upgrading of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) (Matsebula, 1996:13-14). This is in a way trying
to merge SACD and SADC. Mayer and Zarenda (1994: 45)
have as their first option the termination of, or the
downgrading of SACD to a free trade area. Maasdorp is
quoted as saying "an issue which should be faced is that
of downgrading the SACU to a free trade area or a
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pref"rential trade area or even terminate it. ,. (1993:
41) .
Against this argument there are reservations, as
mentioned earlier, ~at should SACU terminate its
existence and its revenue cease flowing to tl;'~ BLNS
countries, humar. ,our from these countries will flow
into South Africa and this will increase unemployment
and the situation will ultimately escalate the crime
rate in South Africa and divert investment from South
Africa.
The third option ,:ding to available literature is to
create a bz-oade: ..:i looser SACU. Hoohlo states that
"One :actor wh.i.ch cannot be removed, which is a
geographical accident is the interdependence of SACD
members including Namibia. It therefore calls for a co-
ordinated planning effort for the entire region on all
economic fronts to arrive at a mutually beneficial
aaaoc Lat.Lon" (Hoohlo, 1990: 104) Hoohlo also mentions
the existence of a monetary union between all member
states, excluding Botswana, and says these are the right
steps towards an economic union.
Maasdorp & Whiteside (1993: 46)state that there is wide
support for the transfurmation of SACUinto an economic
union and that there are reports that Mozambique, Malawi
and Zambia have expressed in private an interest in
j oi r: .t.. "J ~:,.\ r , tIl the Commercial l{eview dated March 1995,
an article written by Gift 8ipho 8iso states that SADC
proposed the expansion 'f SACDto include non-members of
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the organisation and that it should also work towards
the free cross-movement of both labour and capital.
Davies et. al (1993: 59) states that SACD was widely
heralded in official and business circles as the most
successful integration scheme in Africa and thus a
potential model for a broader programme. Matsebula
(1996: 16) also comments, on the basis of the presence
of a common monetary union, that the likelihood of
establishing an economic union is there.
It is recommended that there should be "closer co-
operation in pol:icy formulation, continuous consultation
and a programme of regional industrialisation, all of
this facilitated by a permanent secretariat and an
active Custom Union Commission" (McCarthy, 1992: 23).
This approach can lead to the acceptance of a common,
broad approach to development and a decrease in
compensatory payments and a strengthening of
arrangements, including the establishment of a regional
development bank to promot6 economic devel~pment in the
common customs area.
In addition to this recommendation by McCarthy in the
Business Report, dated 01.08.95, it is reported that the
South African government contributed towards the
establishment of a council of j : nisters from the member
countries, whose council in turn agreed ..m the
estab]ishment of an independent se~retariatl and a
commission of senior technor.rat:f1 from membex-
governments.
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An invitation of the Ministers of BLNS countries to a
negotiation table, by Trevor Manuel as mentioned before,
is an indication of South Africa's acceptance of full
and open partnership in SAeu. According to Business
Report, da~ed 04.07.95, this first ministerial meeting,
which in the future will be able to meet annually,
managed to launch and reopen negotiations of the Customs
Union Task Team (CU~T) The Team introduced three
working groups namely: The Institutional Framework
working committee dealing with the democratisation of
SACU; a technical and investigative working committee
which will supply information required by negotiators on
economic and other issues; and a policy working group
involved with trade and industrial development policies.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY.
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
There are very strong arguments from the literature
reviewed in the previous chapters that apartheid South
Africa, realising its strong econol1ic position emanating
from a well established industrial base, dominated the
members of the customs union to enhance its extended
trade markets and survive the international economic
sanctions imposed against her.
If the situation is investigated very closely an element
of interdependence is observed. Although South Africa
depends on the economic co-operat ..on within the customs
union the BLNS countries are a:i, so dependent on the
industrial well-being of South Africa. South Africa,
realising the factors underlying this kind of regional
co-operation (SACU),had to sacrifice its residual share
of the gross revenue pool by introducing a compensation
factor of 42%above the individual shares of the member
countries.
The first question to be addressed in this study is
whether South Africa's appr0ach to SACU has been
hegemonic, and whether a democratic South Africa will
ensure leadership of SACUmember countries to enhance
mutual economic development or whether it will ma:i.ntain
a hegemonic approach. The workshop held .:n Botswana in
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March 1994, on the eve of the democrat~c elections in
South Africa, had its theme as "Reconstituting and
Democratising the Southern African Customs Union".
Ass~.h1ing that South Africa is willing to lead the
customs union to economic prosperity without practisinH
hegemony, other questions to be answered by this study
would be:
(i) Was South Africa's membership of SACU before 1994
more heyemonic or was it leadership orientated in
character?
(ii) Are the BLNS countries empowered to participate in
the decision making process within SACU?
(iii)What strategies can be implemented towards the
economic development of the whole common customs
area?
(iv) How can all member countries be afforded the
opportunity to explore all existing markets within
the common customs area?
(v) How can revenue shares to member countries be
equitably distributed to the satisfaction of every
SACU member'?
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
Research is defined as "a process of trying tn gain a
better unders'.:aDdi11gof the complexities of human
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interaction" (Rossman & Mardhall, 1989: 21). The choice
of a research method depends on the question to be
answered, as well as on t~e type of data needed.
Practical constraints can also influence the selection
of the research method. The complexity of the choice of
a research method can be overridden by the thorough
understanding of the question Lo be answered and
anticipation of the physical cor;:::>t'raintsor impediments
the researcher can be faced with when an attempt is made
to answer the research question. If the researcher knows
the answer to his research question, it i.snot necessary
for him to continue lookir.g for data, since the needed
data will be readily available in himself.
Selection of a research method is necessary where the
answer to the research question is unknown tG the
researcher, and data has to be sought from remote and
unknown sour'oes . As it is said: "Data lie buried within
the minds and within the attitudes, feelings or
reactions of men and women. As with oil beneath the sea,
the first problem is to devise a tool to probe below the
surface" (Leedy, 1993: 187). The research teol mentioned
is the one to be used to uncover or unfold hidden
answers to the research question and make them
accessibl~ to hu~an knowledge.
The techniques to be used in the collection of data in
this report will be through face-ta-face semi-structured
interviews, supported by a limited number of structured
questionnaires, and a literature review.
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3.2.1 Sample selection
One focus of the research report is the identification
of stakeholders in the topic to be studied. Since this
research is on the South African customs Union, and that
as a limitation stakeholders from the BLNS countries
could not be interviewed, the stakeholders relevant to
this topic were identified as the Department of Trade
and Industry, the Reserve Bank as well as members of
some non-goveLnmental organisations like the Develo~ment
Bank of Southern Africa, Routh African Institute of
International Affairs. (All these institutions are based
in SouLh Africa). The method of selection was one
representative per institution, except at the
Department of trade and Industry and of the Development
Bank of Southern Africa where two people in each cage
were interviewed. This was done realising time
constrains.
3.2.2 Individual in-depth interviews:
Individual in-depth interviews differ from those with
key informants in that their scope is us~ally far wider
and they ar.~ more open ended. In an unstructured
interview, the person interviewed is free to voice his
own concerns anu to share in directing the flow of the
conversation with the interviewer. The researcher relies
on open questions to introduce the topics of interest
and probe for mere information. "The aim is, literally,
an \inter-view': a mutual exploration of the issues,
without the researcher opposing his or her
54
ideas" {Nichols, 1991: 13).
" In a structured social survey, the range of possible
answers to each question are known often in advance and
often listed in the form so that the interviewer can
simply mark the appropriate reply" (Nichols, 1991: 13).
If the range of answers is not known, the researcher
ccnducts a pilot survey to test the questions and see
what answers are given.
In-depth interviews are a valuable tool in themselves.
They are also an essential exploratory stage in
designing a large structured interview survey. The
researcher discovers not only the themes and topics
which interviewees see as important, but how they think
about them and describe them. Building carefully on this
preliminary work results in clearer and sharper research
questions.
Individual unstructured or semi -structured interviews
are especially suitable for work on attitudes or
opinions and for dealing with sensitive topics like the
o~e on the future of SACU. The interview schedule was
derived from the literature and consisted of a series of
structured and checkpoint questions that enabled the
researcher to cover all the important issues while
allowing him to deviate from the schedule as crucial
themes emerged, or as question arose in the course of
the interview.
The interviews were conducted in such a manner that the
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interviewees were afforded greater freedom and
flexibility in answering the questions, with the
interviewer managing to probe further areas that were
not clarified by the respondents, or which appeared to
be important. Open-ended questions were utilised as
investigative instruments toward answering the research
question, and allowed the interviewee to be an inform~nt
rather than merely a respondent
See appendix for a list of interviewees as well as their
places of employment. Face-to-face and semi-structured
interviews were conducted with all these interviewees.
3.2.3 The questionnaire:
3.2.3.1 Reasons for using a questionnaire:
A questionnaire is an instrument used to observe data
beyond the physical reach of the observer. It is used as
a means of eliciting the necessary respons~s from the
respondents about their attitudes, understar.ding
problems experienced and possible solutions towards
reconstitution and democratisation of the Southern
African Customs Union.
Realisjng the limited time given for the completion of
this report and also considering the financial
constraints attached to travelling sjnce the researcher
lives in the Northern Pr'ovance , the realisable option
for accessing data was through the research
questionnaire. Some of the questionnaires were sent to
56
the respondents, and some were used in the semi-
structured interviews conducted.
3.2.3.2 Development and ~ontent of the queotionnaire:
The questionnaire which also formed part of the
interviews was prepared by the researcher. This document
was then given to four classmates for testing its
understandability, and to determine whether it would
elicit the necessary information for the purpose of this
research report. After it had been adapted to suit the
research questions under review, it was then sent to
respondents for data collection.
This questionnaire consisted of 33 questions which took
approximately 45 minutes to respond to. The
questionnaire covered Lnf'orrnar ion under the following
sub-headings:
(A) Participation in decision-making of the customs
union by member states: This sub-heading posed questions
on the existence and functions of the Board on Tariffs
and Trade, whether this Board is still in existence,
what the functions of this Board ,"l.reand how the member
countries of SACU are rep~esented iL th~s Board. It also
touches on the capacity of South Africa to decide on
behalf of the Customs Union, as well as on the existence
of the Secretariat in the SACU. This sub-heading also
deals with the existence of forums involved with
tensions emanating from this economic integration.
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(B) Economic development of the common customs area:
Questions covered und~r this sub-heading are on problems
revolving around industrial polarisation to South
Africa, illegal immigration into south Africa,
development of the common customs area, the presence of
the common rnonetazy union, etc. It investigates the
modalities of trying to develop both the whole common
customs area and measures cf alleviating the problem of
illegal immigration into South African borders.
(C) Free Lnterohe-ncre of goods between L:~e member
countries: The questions in this category have a bearing
on proportions of interchange of goods, free movement of
labour, and proportions of imports and exports between
South Africa and other member countries within the
Customs Union.
(D) Sharing of equitable benefits among members of the
Customs Union: In this case the questions revolving
around percentage shares allocated to individual
countries, the enhancement factor of 42%, the fiscal
discretion of SACU, the involvement of the Reserve Bank,
and the inolusion of the sales and excise duties in the
revenue sharing formu·.a etc., are attended to.
3.3 DATA ANALYSIS:
The data collected from respondents as well as
interviewees were o:..-ganised in such d. way that the
relationship between member countries within SACU, and
differences between member countries, could be weLl,
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understood. The data collected through semi-structured
interviews, as well as through research questionnaires
were examined, organised, combined and categorised in
patterns with a view of addressing the initial study
questions. In exa.mining data, the problem of personal
and political biases were experienced, but these were
avoided as far as possible.
The questionnaire used for seeking data was also
structured in such a way that the research questions
would be answered. The data were ord sd by grouping
responses from different questions together, looking at
the certain features, similarities of answers to
questions, differences in or diversity of answers, as
well as strength of suggestions.
The concluding discussion and the recommendations based
on this research report are based on the data collected
for the purpose of answering the research question and
the interpretation thereof.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4 RESULTS AND FINDINGS:
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters dealt with the information
drawn from the literature review and the research design
relevant to the topic. This chapter examines the data
collected or information drawn from people who responded
to qupstionnaires ~s well as semi-structured interviews.
The interpretation of data collected is used to answer
the question whether South Africa's approach to SACU has
been hegemonic, and whether a democratic South Africa
will enSULe leadership of SAeu member countries tG
enhance mutual economic development or whether it will
maintain a hegemonic approach.
Further questions to be answered by this research are:
(i) Was South Africa's membership of SACU before 1994
more hegemonic or was it leadership orientated in
character?
(ii) Are the BLNS countries empowered to participate in
the decision making process within SAeU?
(iii)What strategies can be implemented towards the
economic development of the whole common customs
area?
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(iv) How can all member countries be afforded the
opportunity to explore all existing markets within
the common customs area?
(v) How can revenue shares to membe:..: countries be
equitably distributed to the satisfaction of every
SAeu member?
4.2 The Pre-1994 SACU
There is a general agreement from all respondents that
SAeu has not changed much from what it was after 1969,
although expectations were that the institutic 1 would
change with the election of a democratic government in
South Africa. It is felt that the relationship between
South Africa and the BLNS countries was more one of
domination by the RSA than one of partnership with the
RSA leading the development of the whole SAeu.
All respondents accept that the BLNS countries were
concentrating more on revenue returns than on
development of their own economies. According to Ghandi
Hattings, Rashad Cassim, Talitha Bertelmann, and John
Kodisang, the enhancement factor of ,1:2% afforded to tne
BLNS countries was in compGnsation for adverse effp.cts,
and should be utilised by the BLNS countries towards the
development of their own individual economies.
Although substantial amounts were given to the BLNS
countries in the form of compensation, Thomas and Van
Niekerk have a concern that the BLNS countries have
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provided trade markets for South Afr: ca and therefore
the RSA should initiate alternative strategies towards
economic development of the BLNS countries. There is a
need to shift away from the 1969 SACU agreement which
gave South Africa the advantage to hegemonic approach in
SACU. All the responclent,.lagree that the yearning for
reconstitution and democratisation of SACU (by BIJNS
countries) is becoming overdue.
4.3 The present SACU (from the South African viewpoint):
An interview with the Der~ty Director of The Department
of Trade and Industry 'uTI)1 Ghandi Hattings, revealed
that almost all the commi t t.ees and oomma aei.ons which
started functioning after the 1969 agreements are still
in existence. Regardless of the diverse, dynamic and
complex economic and political environment prevalent in
SACU, the institution's mode of operation as explained
in the second chapter I still stands. As evidence to
thisl the following points need to be revisited:
4.3.1 Participation in decision making:
According to all respondents, the Boa~d on tariffs and
tradel a private institution existing under the South
African law, is still in existence and is performing the
same functions. Hattings argues that the BLNS countries
were several times invited to nominate from their
countries representatives into the Board, but this
invitation was declined with reasons that the.Board was
a formation of South African legislation. The functions
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of the Board are as follows:
(i) Deciding on the common external tariffs in such a
way that the interests of all member parties are
prot.eot.ed . It also investigates the presence of
these tariffs including ordinary custOITISduties,
anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
(ii)This Board also plays a role in the development of
South African industries where the tariff is
involved.
In relation to participation in decision-making, a
majority of respondents agree that the decision on the
common ta.riff still rests on South Africa since the
Board on Trade and Tariffs is the only body that can
recommend to the Minieter of Trade and Industry.
The Legal Advisor and Policy Analyst at the DBSA,
Rosalind Thomas, argues that even if the decision rests
with the RSA, an attempt is made to consult with the
BLNS countries. One other respondent from the South
African Revenue Service (SARS), Grant Busby, argues that
although South Africa hew to consult the BLNS states i.n
terms of Article 5(1) of the SAeU agreement, it does not
need the concurrence of BLNS to amend the custom duty,
but where the BLNS ',as a serious problem with a tariff,
RSA will take th..:t concerns into consideration.
According to a respondent f1"
Brevis, it is argued that
the. Reserve Bank, Jacky
even if the 'Board' is
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responsible for determining the external tariff, this is
done in such a way that the interest of all member
countries are protected. In principle all the
respondents, to the question on decision-making agree,
that even if negotiations by the member countries have
n., t yet been finalised, South Africa still holds the
decision making power, but in honouring the stipulations
of the 1969 SACUA, an attempt is made to consult with
the BLNS countries.
Hattings, elaborating on consultation with the BLNS
countries says "the only body in SACD wh ich can
recommend a new or amended rate of duty and rebates of
the duty is the BTT. It acts on behalf of the wh0le of
SACD, but can only do so if inputs are received from
BLNS countries". The recommendations from this Board
can only be approved by the Mi::1ister of Trade and
Industry (in South Africa) .
still referring to the issue of 'adequate time' for
consultation, all responding parties agree that the time
scheduled for consultation is 8 weeks. Busby and
Hattings say that the time could be extended when
necessary. In addition Busby goes on to point out that
RSA and the BLNS countries are given the same time to
comment on any proposed changes.
On the question of establishing forums to facilitate the
involvement of the BLNS in decision-making, all
respondents agree that there are fully representative
forums established for discussion of matters related to
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the (;ustoms union, but referred this matter to the DTI
for elaboration. The Deputy Director of the Department
of Trade and Industry, responding to the question on
forums mentioned the following committees which cannot
constitute the quorum of a meeting in the absence of a
delegation from one of the countries:
(i) Customs Technical Liaison Cc.mmi.t.t.ee was
established in approximately 1970, and holds its
meetings three times per year, and dis~usses mainly
customs procedures and implementation of tariff
measures.
(ii) Trade and Industry Liaison r'offirnitteewas
established in approximately 1972. It also holds
meetings three times per year and disctlfses mat.ters
on trade and industry and marketing of agricultural
products.
(iii)Transport Liaison Committee was established in
approximately 1975. It is Ad Hoc and is pr'e.sent Ly
operating und~r The Memorandum of Understanding on
Road 'I'ransportation.This committee reports to the
Customs Union Commission.
(iv) Custom union Commission was established in 1970
immediately after the 1%::' SACU agreement. rhis
body meets once in a year to settle matters not
solved in liaison committees, adopts annual reports
of liaison committees and recommends that shares of
BLNS countries in the pool be approved.
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In addition to the committees tabled above, Thomas and
one other Policy Analyst at DBSA, Lolette Van Niekerk,
shedding light on the existence of committees mention
the Customs Union Task Team (CUTT). They say that there
are three negotiation working groups within CUTT. The
functions of these groupings are: deciding on
constitutional matters; drawing policy on industrial
ac..:tivitiesand competition in agriculture; and tedmical
investigation on th revenue sharing formula. All member
countries are represented in these working committees.
They also mention that the commission is still in
existence. This argument was also supported by all
other respondents. The Trade Advisor at DTI, John
Kodisang elaborated by mentioning that the different
working committees assist in advising the Commission of
Ministers.
4.3.2 Economic development of the common customs area:
Responding to issues revolving around industrialisation,
Hattings comments that some economists regard industrial
concentration to South ]\.frica as not deliving from
economic co-operation witn BLNS countries. They argue
that if South Africa is viewed alongside countries which
are. - members of SACU but located in the southern part
of Africa (e.g. Angola, Zambia, Mozambique etc.), it
will be realised that there is a concentration of
industry Lr South Africa, but he also acknowledges that
SACU has a remarkal)le impact on industrial growth in
South Africa coriaide r'Lnq extended trade markets afforded
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by the BLNS countries.
JaGkey shares the same concern that the membership of
South Afri~a in SACU has nothing to do with industrial
concentration. He goes on to mention that concentration
of Lnduat ry is there within South Africa, where more
industrial sectors are established in tile metropolitan
areas than in rural a:ceas. Brevis says "industrial
concentration is the result of investment decisions made
by investors. The existence of SACU does not affect
these investors' location decisions."
This concern is also shared by Rashad Cassim, the
director at Trade and industrial policy Secretariat,
saying that, although to a limited extent South Africa
contributed to slow development in the BLNS economies,
this is not for the purpose of skewing industry to South
Africa. Concentration of indust:y to a specific area is
a result of the fact that investors are attracted more
towards an area with a well developed infrastructure.
Cassim fur~her argues that the issues revolving around
concentration of industry, create an area of concern
even among the SADC countries. The idea of attraction of
investors by good infrastructural exposure is strongly
supported by Talitha Bertelsmann, an interviewee from
the South African Institute of Interne: ..mal Affairs
(SAIIA) and all other respondents.
Also sharing this concern are the Associate Director for
Policy Analysis (DBSA), and the legal adviser in the
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Policy unit (DBSA). Their concern is that even if SACD
did not exist, there would still be labour movement from
all Southern African states, because of employment
opportunities, into an industrially developed South
Africa.
In response to a question on price raising effects, the
two interviewees f:-:-omthe DBSA argue that the price
raising effects cannot be eliminated. They will always
be there as long as there are differentials caused by
inter alia, transportation costs, h~gh tariffs, etc.
These effects should only be managed. It should also be
noted that SACD is a member of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and that this or~anisation opts for
faster tariff reduction than GATT suggests. They
mention that if BLNS count i Les can Lmpor t; goods more
competitively from other sources other than South
Africa, this may help in the reduction of price raising
effects.
They further argue that it should be remembered that the
BLNS countries also benefited from being protected by
the RSA tariff, and that South Africa in turn does not
want to reduce the tariff soon because this will result
in de-industrialisation.
Hattings share the same argument with the two adding
that the price raising effects are gradually reduced and
the BLNS is getting 17% for these effects. Brevis
fu:t:t.he r argues that if the external tariff is reduced,
the price raising effects will also reduce, (.1d that
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total elimination of price raising effects is as good as
abolishing SACUA.
All Lrrt ervi.ewees and respondents agree that illegal
migration of labour from foreign countries create
problems for South Africa, which is occupied with the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and is
addressing the high unemployment rate locally. They
agree that if migration affects the unemployment levels,
it will also impact on the crime rate and ultimately
reflects on investment opportunities into South African
borders.
Thomas, commenting on illegal immigration, sta~es that
the BLNS countries are South Africa's captive market.
They support South African industry and therefore our
labour. But it should be remembered that labour
migration threatens local labour. She says that the
solution to the problem lies in cross border movement of
capital into BLNS countries, which means investment by
RSA companies in the BLNS territories to generate
employment l0cally. She views this as an economic
development strategy for the BLNS courrc ri.es, which will
ult.Lmat.e Ly resolve the problem of illegal migration of
Labou r .
'Talitha agrees with Th0mas and expatiates by saying that
problems of economic development of BLNS countries and
migration of labour can be solved by creating work,
health programmes, building Schools, improving the
existing infrastructure and stabilising the political
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scene in the BLNS.
This contribution as a solution to the migration problem
is supported by Lolette who said that except fc..rcross-
border investment in productive activities, there should
be policies and programmes put in place "to deal with
supply side or struct.ural issues like: inadequate
infrastructure, -t ick of skills, lack of capacitated
intrepreneurs, etc.".
Hattings argues that investors (as well as labour) were
historically attracted t.o South Africa because of the
discovery of gold and government policy. The two factors
culminated at development of the best infra-structure by
tar-roads, rail, large universities, telecommunication,
etc. He further indicates that a lack of industrial
development. initiatives in the BLNS cause foreigners to
stream into South Africa and increases the unemployment
rate in the country.
He cites the fact that lack of industrialisation in the
BLNS hampers j ob+cz eat aon and people in BLNS countries
tend to rely on primary industries (agriculture and
mining). He complements Swaziland tor the norrnaLiaation
of the political scene as a strategy which may work
against the industrial concentration phenomenon. This
means that Ghanai not only includes lack of
infrastructure, but also the instabi~ity of the
political scene as the contributory factor affecting
investment in the BLNS countries.
70
All interviewees agree that t.he Common Monetary Union
(CMU) between South Africa, NaMibia, Lesotho and
Swaziland make s trade and cross-border investments much
easier by discarding the red tape involved in exchange
rates. Cassim and the two ot.her interviewees from the
DBSA also agree that the currency of Botswana, despite
having a different value, is easily exchangeable in the
whole customs area, making trade easy among the members
of SACU. Thomas says that the common monetary union is
the st.....'")ngestfeature of SACD and has been the major
aspect. f its success, as compared with other economic
co-operation components throughout the world.
Brevis explains that aft.erNamibia had joined the Common
Monetary Area (CMA) in 1992, the name changed to the
Multilateral Monetary Agreement (Ml'flA).He further
explains t.hatthe South African Rand is the legal tender
in all member countries except Botswana. The cu=rencies
have a one-to-one exchange rate and no restrictions
(limited exceptions) apply to the transfer of funds
within the region. This makes the public and private
companies of LNS (Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) to
have access to South African money and capital.
Therefore the system of exchange controls in force in
South Africa is in all material aspeccs substantially in
agreement with the exchange controls applied in the
governments of LNS.
Hattings further says that Article 6 of the SACD
agreement allows the BLNS states to protect their infant
industry by means of tariffs. This statement is
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supported by all other respondents. Hattings also
argues that the BLNS can also implement a duty against
goods from other members, but, only Botswana has in the
past made use of this provision for protection of their
soap and flour-milling industry.
Van Niekerk argues that the permi,sible period for
support of such Lndust.ry should be in terms of GATT and
the SACUA. There should be a clear definition of
'infant industry' and support for such industry should
not be tariff oriented but rather supply-side oriented
and country specific.
idea of supply side
Thomas and Cassim support the
measure as an appropriate
alternative for tariff oriented measure. Cassim also
mentions investment incentives and improvement of
infrastructural costs as viable options for supporting
infant industries.
When arguing about development programmes or strategies
to be implemented in the customs area, Thomas and van
Niekerk share the same view that there should be less
emphasis on compensatory mechanisms and mindset in
favour of a development finance orientation and funding
mechanism. It is said t.hat this requires a shift of
thinking among BLNS countries from dependency on
budgetary resources to acceptance of need for funds for
development purposes.
The two ment ·Loned above I
that other strategies
ordinated approaches on
supported by Kodi sang I argue
are the harmonised and co-
a number of policies (i.e.
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trader industrialr monetarYr etc.) and incentives.
Cassim agrees with the three and calls for the
estabLi.al merit;of effective development forums. TaLd.t.ha ,
agreeing with the same argumentr further suggests that
South African industries should be encouraged to invest
in the BLNS count' ~s.
Brevisr arguing on development strategies, mentions that
the BLNS countries have been consulted and informed
about the work done by the Industrial Development Bank
(IDB) on a Regional Industrial Location Strategy (RILS).
Ghandi mentions that specific industrial development
p.roqr-amme.sthat involve the tariff, such as the Duty
Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS; for the textile and
clothing industries and the Motor Industrial Development
Programme (MIDP), are open to custom union members- if
they play the same rules. He closes by saying that the
development of eco-tourism could present possibilities
for economic upliftment for the entire SACU.
Kodisang argues that the establishment of CUTT is seen
as an initiative or a strategy on :':hepart of South
Africa to involve the BLNS countries in decision-making,
thus democratising SACU to a level where the future of
SACU member' countries will be a j oint decision of all
membership. He goes on to say that all development
strategies at SACU level should be linked to the SADC
process, having a clear appreciation of bilateral talks
between South Africa and the European Union (EU) and the
re-negotiation of the Lome Convention which is to resume
in September 1998. He also mentions that some of the
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BLNS countries are members of the List Developed
Countries (LDCs), hence South Africa has to take the
lead with credible development strategies.
4.3.3 Free interchange of goods between the member
countries:
Hattings mentions that all trade in SACU is essenti~ll}
free, apart from a few exceptions, as was said in 4.2.2
above whe re it was stated that the BLNS have import
control in place in some instances. ~his agreement
covers only goods and not labour. This comment is also
shared by Thomas, Bertelsmann, Cassim and van Niekerk
who elaborates by mentioning that even if there is to a
large extent free movement of goods between member
countries, t.here ::l.re
agricultural products.
some res~rictions regarding
Issues reldted +:0 free movement of goods have a bearing
on protection of infant industries. Hattings argues that
Article 6 of SACUA allows the BLNS countries to protect
infant industries by means of a tariff. This clarifies
that with free movement of goods in place there was to a
minimal extent deviation to this agreement. Regardless
of arguments based on Article 0, to a large extent all
respondents and interviewees agree that there is free
movement of goods.
The following figures were prepared by the Reserve Bank
after studying intra-SACU trade. The compilation of
these figures was done in 1993, and it reflects on the
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import-export activities of all the member countries of
SACU. A question on these activities was asked to every
respondent or interviewee. Almost all the respondents
referred to either the Reserve Bank or the Department of
Trade and Industry in their response, hence these
figures, which will be regarded as a true reflection of
the activities of the SACU member countries. The left
side reflects total imports (from other membe~s to South
Africa), and the right side t.ot.a.iexports from South
Africa.
IMPORTS IN RAND (1993) EXPORTS IN RAND (1993)
~. r: 0S. AJ.:r~ca:I~3064 001 3% S. Africa :R1~ 820 378 220
Botswana : R4 635 524 912 Botswana : R492 062 294
Lesotho : R3 476 447 034 Lesotho : R253 287 218
Namibia : R3 353 172 788 Namibia : R799 993 014
Swaziland: R2 355 233 486 Swaziland: R1 518 658 868
NAME OF COUNTRY IMPORTS:EXPORTS
S. Africa 0,222 : 1
Botswana 9,421 : 1
Lesotho 13,725 : 1
Namibia 4,192 : 1
Swazilan(.. 1,551 : 1
-
The figures were collected for thE!purpose of explaining
the disparities informed by the interchange of goods
between member countries. The display above shows that
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th~ Lesotho ratio is the Worst. Ghandi says that it is
because Lesotho exports less to South Africa. All other
il.~erviewees regard Lesotho as the worst with regard to
dependability on South Africa. According to both
figures and the respondents Swaziland is seen as the
best because it sells a lot of sugar products, timbers
and refrigerators to South Africa. It is also expected
that the ratio for imports in Botswana will decrease
since the country is now exporting a lot of cars to
South Africa.
Casa.i.m, Bertelsmcmn, Brevis, van Niekerk and Thomcls
share the same argument that, over and above the car
trade, the exportation of soda ash and beef etc.,
contrjbute towards gradual stabilisation of Botswana's
economy.
4.3.4 Sharing of equitable benefits among members of the
Cus toms Union:
Responding to the functions of the Reserve Bank related
to SACU, Hattings said that the bank assists in checking
the BLNS inputs and calculating BLNS revenue shares
annually. The bank also participates in renegotiations
of SACU agreements, especially on the revenue sharing
formula. This point is also made by all other
respondents and interviewees. They also indicate that
South Africa still holds the fiscal discretionary power
of SACU. South Africa's functions revolve around the
collect Lo.i and disbursement of SAeU revenue.
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Concerning the enhancement and the stabilisation factor
which was fixed at 42%, Hattings said that BLHS
countries are now guaranteed a minimum of 17% on goods
produced and consumed in their countries. This comment
is shared by four more respondents out of seven- two of
whom did not respond to t+ Ls question on stabilisation
of revenue shares. Busby indicates that the 17% is
guaranteed on all impor cs, value of excisable gOuds
produced and the excise duty paid thereon.
This comment is also made in an attempt to address
issues revolving around the exclusion of sales and
excise duties in the revenue sharing formula. When all
respondents agree that this matter is recej.ving
attention in the renegotiation forum, Busby argues that
"the sales duties no longer exist and the RSA determines
the rates of excise duty payable within SACU, and if
this lack of fiscal discretion poses a pro: sm, the
unresolved matters should be taken to negotiation
forum." This clarifies that negotiations are regarded as
a means of settling disputes.
Regardless of this 17% guarantee stipulated above,
Hattings mentions that thE:.BLNS maintain that they can
get larger amounts if they get income on consumption on
goods like, wine, cigarettes etc. He also mentions that
the new, revenue sharing formula can address this issue.
The following table illustrates the revenue shares of
individual countries over a period of three years after
the Government of National Unity came to be. The value
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of this table is to illustrate the returns of individual
countries regarding the revenue srlares over a period of
three years. From the table below it can be seen that
the revenue shares of the BLNS appreciates OV8r the
years, as that of South Africa depreciates:
Percentage Shar~
Year Botswana Ilesoth Namibia Swaziland S Africa
0
1994/95 9,28 7,25 9,57 5,69 68,20
1995/96 10,74 7,71 10,22 6,33 64,99
1996/97 9,96 6,99 1(1,89 6,49 65,63
This table was made available by a respondent from the
Reserve Bank.
On the new revenue sharing formula all respondents and
interviewees referred the question to the DTI. Hattings
says that the idea of a new formula was based on the
price raising effects of goods traded with~n the P
area. The trade weighed average value of the Clan
external tariff was calculated on goods importee:..by
each country and in case of the BLNS count ries, the
duty collected on goods imported from outside was added
to the BLNS price raising values. In the case of South
Africa, the value of the price raising effects of the
tariff on imports from BLNS would be calculated and to
this some percentage (X factor) of the duties actually
collected by the RSA would be added. The percentage was
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never tabled, and this is cause for not concluding the
negotiation on the revenue sharing formula.
Hattings continue to say that the idea was then to add
all the values t which meant. that one would get the
ratio for each member count ry and t.hat ratio would be
applied to the real pool of customs duties to calculate
each country's share. He adds by saying that exc :se
duties would no longer be part of the formula and each
country would get income from excise duties on a
"collect and keep" basis. Excise duties would be
harmonised to avoid smuggling of goods.
\
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 CONCLUSION
The Southern Africa Customs Union had as its aim the
establishment of a union of neighbouring countries that
would be characterised by economic co-operation among
members. The inter-relationship of these countries was
to be realised through free movement of goods be tween
member countries and the introduction of a common
tariff against non-members. From an agreement made in
1969 by member countries, the framework of movement of
goods between members, as well as the collection and
disbursement of the common :revenue pool, was
documented.
In answering these questions, the researcher focuses on
how South Africa's hegemonic role within SACU
disadvantaged the BLNS and how the post-apartheid South
Africa prov1des leadership to SACU, taking the interest
of the members into consideration; and hew the economic
growth of the common customs area can be enhanced by
the leadership role played by South Africa.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, one of the areas
of major concern wichin SACU is the involvement of the
BLNS countries in decision-making forums within the
customs union. With speciric reference to this concern,
it will be realised (from chapter two and four) that
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there is a tension emanating from compensation of BLNS
countries by South AfrLca for adverse effects. This
tension is observed where BLNS countries feels that they
are not compensated enough, and South Africa on the
other hand feel that it i.sgiving out too much in the
form of compensation and that membership of SACD is
becoming too expensive. There is also tension, as
mentioned in the previous chapters, revolving around the
concentration of industry as well as the decision making
power to South Africa.
Although the tensions referreJ. to abov= couLd not" be
amicably r'eaoLved in the past, th~ South A-:rican
Minister of Trade and Industry convened a meeting of
Ministers from different inembe r countries within SACD i1'1
1994 to discuss future trends aimed at the
reconstitution and democratisation of the customs union.
This Commission of Ministers agreed that CDTT (Cunt.orns
Union Task Team) be established. This fully
representative task team was charged with the function
of reconstituting and democratising SACU. The task team
was to make recomme: lations to. the Commission of
Ministers about the future of SACU. The task Team
immediately introduced three working committees,
mentioned in previous chapters, dealing with fundamental
issues like the constitutional framework and technical
and investigative issues, as well as with trade and
industrial development issues. It is believed that if
all these functions can be satisfied, the development of
SACH i.ngeneral will be guaranteed.
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The initiative South Africa took in facilitating such a
meeting explains firstly, the leadership and
responsibility RSA is prepared to expose in resolving
tensions caused by the apart.heid regime, and secondly,
expectations on the South African side, of maximum
participation from BLNS countries to ensure satisfaction
of all SACD member countries, with the hope of ninding
every member to decisions taken and agreements reached.
This approach removes t~le hegemonic power from South
Africa ~nd thus empowers all member states with
responsibility and accountability on decisions adopted.
South Africa in this case relinquishes power in favour
of leading SACD into a democratic institution, where
every member will equitably benefit from his membership
of tl.ecustoms union.
Pocus.Lnq on the economic development of SACU, chapter
two argues about dissatisfaction of the BLNS countries
regarding skewing af industry to South Africa. Chapter
four focuses on the cause for industrial concentration
in RSA, where mention is made of infrastructural well-
being, political stability, etc. The fourth chapter also
addresses solutions to the problems as the establishment
of a development fund for all SA~D member countries,
cross border capital and entr3preneurial skills, etc.
Relationship between SACD member countries is dependent-
hegemonic in character, with South Africa on one side
and the BLNS countries on the other side. There is
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mistrust against RSA from the BLNS side, caused by
hegemonic power South Africa exposed towards the BLNS
countries. The decisions taken by South Africa on
behalf of the BLNScountries are always adhered to with
b_rious suspicion. Representation in decision making and
an acceptable environment for partnerships seem to be
the rightful solution to the problem. Negotiated
settlement of disputes between member countries could
elicit better and effective solutions to the tensions
within the customs union.
South Africa, being an economic giant in the Southern
African region, is expected to take a leadership
position in an attempt to enhance the right political
and economic climate. fer regional economic development.
This ideal could be realised by the introduction of
cross border investments, the establishment of a
development fund within SACU, maximumutilisation of
common economic resources, harmonisation of both
political and economic policies, and removal of barriers
towards and enhancement of free participation in the
custom union markets.
Referring to the free interchange of goods between
member countries, different authors of papers on SACU
highlight that the BLNSalways complained protection of
infant industry, the introduction of the secret
memorandum, etc. as contributing factors
concentration of industry in South Africa.
towards the
A general
consensus among interviewees and respondents (from South
Africa) is that the skewing of industry has nothing to
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do with SACUmembership or unfair trade relations. The
interest of investors in the selection of a locality for
investment is the contributing factor. The partnership
within SACU should focus on the establishment of a
conducive climate for investment which is infrastructure
related and economically acceptable, e. g. the border
control measures should not be restrictive in that they
disallow transportation of commodities allover the
commoncustoms area.
It is suggested that the inclusion of the enhancement
factor in the revenue sharing formula shou~d as much as
possible be avoided. A recommendation is made that
finance should be channeled into a developmenL fund
aiming at the economic upliftment of individual member
countries within SAeu.
The sharing of revenue, a factor which assumed the core
of activities in SACU, was reported to be receiving
attention from CUTTand should be given a chance of
completing its evolution process. A recommendation is
made that the decision on the revenue sharing formula
should eliminate all areas of discontent and focus on
the basis of receiving a proportion as much as what was
contributed, (i. e. the costs should match the benefits
from customs union involvement) not forgetting the
directing of some amounts to the regional development
fund.
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5.2 RECOMV~NDATIONS
1. Noting that the democratic South Africa is accepted
into broader trade relations with the whole Southern
Africa, and that the latter has its economic prosperity
hopes pinned on the former, it is questionable whether
SACU will survive, or will be maintained with the new
member countries accepted i.e. broadening the boundaries
of the present common customs area.
2. A study should be made on how South Africa can lead
the economic development of the entire Southern African
region with SAeu member countries included.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
YOu are requested to fill in the following
questionnaire for Tsebe K.B as part fulfillment for
his Masters of Management degree from the Universit:y
of the Witwatersrand. Thanking you in advance.
TOPIC: South Africa's role in the Southern African
Customs Union(Leadership or Hegemony): 1994-1996
1. Participation in decision-making of the customs
union by member States:
1.1. Does the South African Board on Tariffs and Trade
still exists? (YES/NO).
1.2. If yes, what are this board's functions, as
related to the Southern African Custom's Union(SACU}?
1.3 Does the decision on common external ta:ciff for
the Customs Union still rest on South l.frica, as it
was in the 1969 SACU agreements? (YES/NO).
1.4. if No, how are these decisions made?
1.S. If Yes, does the principle of 'Adequate Time' for
consultation still exists? (YES/NO) .
1.6. In case 'Adequate Time' for consultation still
prevails, how long is this time?
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1.7. Does a Secretariat exist within SACU?(YES/NO)
1.8. If Yes, which country holds and hosts the
Secretariat? --------------------------------
1.9. Are there foru~s established by member states for
consultation, regular meetings or
negotiations? (YES/NO) . When where these forums
established and wh ,.... is their
functions? -------------------------
1.10. If there are forums ur meetings, how regular do
these ; meet and what are their functions?
2. Economic development of the common customs area:
2.1. What problems does industrial
South Africa create tc all members
union(South Africa includeQ~?
polarisation to
of the customs
2.2. What \.,~asures can be taken to alleviate the
problem of illegal immigration into South Africa?
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2.3. What development programmes or strategies can be
implemer 'd in the Common Customs Area (CCA) to ensure
mutuali,_ in the development of member states?
------------_._---_. __ ..._--------
2.4. What strategies did South Africa adopt to enhance
the existing development programmes?
~ 5. Does the
effects on
CCA? (YES/NO) .
lack
the
of common
development
monetary
strategy
union
of
have
the
2.6. If Yes, ~hat arc the eff8cts?
2.7. How can the price raising effects of the South
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African exports be eliminated?
2.8. What measures does individual members of the CCA
employ in the protection of infant industries?
2.9. Are there South African based industrial sector
established in other member countries? (YES/NO) .
3. Free interchange of goods and services between the
member count~ies:
3 .1. Is there any free interchange of goods between
South Africa and other member countries? (YES/NO)
3.2. If No, WHat
implementation, .f thi
are the barriers for the
1969 agreement?
3.3. If Yes I what proportion of imports exist. between
South Africa and each of the BLNS countries from 1994
to 1996.
YEAR ProportioL(South Africa: one BLNS countries)
1994
1995 ..........................................................................................................
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1996
3.4. Does the Customs Unions also include as one of
its agreements, the free movement. of labour between
member states? (YES/NO) .
3.5. If No, what border control measures are put in
place to control illegal imwigration?
4. Sharing of e~~_ cl~le be~efits among members of the
Customs Union:
4.1. What. dre the percer:~.age shares of individual
members ct the Southern African Customs Union ( from
1994 to 1996)?
YEAR PERCENTAGE SHARE
Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland S.
Africa
1994
1995
1996 •• · ~ , U I •• I I • •••..................................................
4.2. Does che enhancement factor of 42% still exist in
the revenu~ sr'ring formula? (YES/NO) .
1.3. The inclusion of the sales and excise duties in
the revenue sharing formula posed prob18ms to the BLNS
countries. How can/was this resolved?
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4.4. The \Sunday Times" dated 1969.10.27 stated that
the ne~ revenue sharing formula was negotiated. Please
forward the new ~evenue sharing formula.
4.5. Which countr~ holds the fiscal discr~tion of the
Customs Union? -----------------------
4.6. How is the South African Reserve Bank involved in
the control of the revenue pool?
4.7. The time lapse before member countries of SACU
could receive their revenue shares was a problem.
How was this problem solved?
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